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Products Liability-An Analysis
of Market Share Liability
I. INTRODUCTION
David A. Fischer*
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories1 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia created the market share liability theory of recovery for
products liability cases. The innovative Sindell theory, which ap-
plies to certain products liability cases in which causation is either
questionable or difficult to prove, departed significantly from the
traditional tort principles of causation and liability. The theory
allows plaintiffs to recover damages for their injuries, but it dis-
counts the defendant's liability by the probability that it did not
cause the harm. Liability under the market share theory is poten-
tially enormous. Although it currently applies to only a narrow
range of cases, the theory-if expanded further-could have a tre-
mendous effect on tort law as a whole.
The problem that gave rise to the creation of market share
liability resulted from the marketing of a drug known as diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES), which is a synthetic form of the female hormone
estrogen.t Between 1947 and 1971, the drug was used widely to
prevent miscarriage. In 1971, however, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, after receiving statistically significant evidence of a
causal connection between the use of DES and the subsequent de-
velopment of vaginal and cervical clear cell adenocarcinoma-a
rare form of cancer-in the female offspring of DES users,3 with-
drew approval of the drug's use for this purpose." In the twenty-
four years preceding the agency's withdrawal of approval, an esti-
mated one-half million to three million users of DES had exposed
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A., 1965, J.D., 1968, University
of Missouri-Columbia. Member, Missouri Bar.
1. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
2. Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REv. 963 (1978).
3. Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully, Epidemiologic aspects and factors related
to survival in 384 Registry cases of clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and cervix, 135
AM. J. OBsTrT. GYNECOL. 876 (1979); Comment, supra note 2, at 964.
4. Comment, supra note 2, at 965-66.
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their offspring to the drug's dangers.'
A far more common disorder than adenocarcinoma that
daughters of DES users have experienced is vaginal adenosis,
which is a disorder that results from the growth of columnar epi-
thelium or mucinous products in the vaginas-apparently normal
tissue that has developed in an abnormal location.7 Doctors once
suspected that this tissue growth was a precancerous condition.
Some recent medical literature, however, indicates that the growth
is not precancerous, 8 and that it often disappears spontaneously.
Potential monetary damages to the offspring of DES users are
estimated to be in the billions of dollars.10 The true extent of the
harm that the use of DES by pregnant women has caused, how-
ever, is unclear, since doctors have reported relatively few actual
cases of DES-related cancer. A worldwide registry of women suffer-
ing from adenocarcinoma indicates that only 384 of the women
who have contracted the disease were born between 1940 and
1971.11 Moreover, only 213 of these cases were associated with the
use of DES.12 All 213 cases may not have been caused by DES,
however, because the evidence suggesting a causal connection be-
tween the use of DES by pregnant women and the subsequent de-
velopment of adenocarcinoma in their offspring is not definitive.
1 3
New cases almost certainly will develop in the future, but probably
at a diminished rate,1 4 since the number of new cases peaked in the
middle 1970s.' 5 Of course, a second peak conceivably could develop
in the future,'6 but available information does not indicate that
this will happen.
5. Comment, supra note 2, at 965 & n.6.
6. R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 158 (1980); Note, Beyond Enterprise
Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REV. 695, 696 & n.12 (1981); Interview with Dr.
A.L. Herbst, reprinted in 30 Ca-A-Cancer J. for Clinicians 326 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Interview].
7. Interview, supra note 6, at 329.
8. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 158; Note, supra note 6, at 696 n.12; Interview, supra
note 6, at 329.
9. Note, supra note 6, at 696 n.12; Interview, supra note 6, at 329.
10. Henderson, Products Liability, DES Litigation: The Tidal Wave Approaches
Shore, 3 CORPORATION L. REV. 143, 143 (1980); Comment, supra note 2, at 968 & n.21; Note,
A Remedy for the "DES Daughters" Products Liability Without the Identification Re-
quirement, 42 U. Pirr. L. REV. 669, 691 (1981).
11. Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully, supra note 3, at 877.
12. Id.
13. Note, supra note 6, at 713-14; Interview, supra note 6, at 331.
14. Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully, supra note 3, at 882.
15. Id.; Interview, supra note 6, at 327.
16. Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully, supra note 3, at 883.
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Plaintiffs in DES lawsuits-the female offspring of DES
users-face a number of obstacles in their efforts to obtain some
form of recovery for the injuries that they have sustained. One of
their major impediments is trying to prove that a particular manu-
facturer was the source of the DES that the plaintiff's mother con-
sumed. To establish a cause of action under either a negligence or
a strict liability theory, the plaintiff typically must demonstrate
that the defendant produced the product which caused the harm.'
Since any physical damage that DES has caused will not surface
until the daughter of a DES user experiences one of the disorders,
the harm often is discovered only after a prolonged period of la-
tency. Furthermore, DES is a generic drug that as many as 300
different companies-using a common formulal'---manufactured." °
At the time the drug was on the market, pharmacists filled pre-
scriptions by using any brand of DES that they happened to have
on the shelf.' ° Unfortunately, the pharmacists' records often are
inadequate to identify the source of the drug.' In many DES
cases, therefore, the plaintiff is unable to prove that a certain de-
fendant actually produced the particular product that caused the
harm. 3
Many DES cases currently are pending, 8 but most of them
are not yet at the stage of attempting to resolve the causation is-
sue. The few decided cases have dealt with the problem in a vari-
ety of ways. The majority of them have found for the defendant
when the plaintiff has been unable to identify the source of the
drug. 4 In a few cases, however, the court has found for the plain-
tiffs by straining traditional tort theories such as alternative liabil-
ity.2 5 The alternative liability theory shifts the burden of proof on
the element of causation to the defendants when the facts indicate
that all the defendants are wrongdoers, but that only one of
17. See, e.g., Namm v. Charles E. Froast & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121
(App. Div. 1981).
18. 4 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 492, 493 (1980).
19. See note 137 infra.
20. 4 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 18, at 493.
21. See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div.
1981).
22. Comment, supra note 2, at 972.
23. Id. at 967; Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 980, 1015 n.189
(1979).
24. 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 18, at 492.
25. See, e.g., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div.
1980). The court also has strained the concert of action theory as a method of imposing
liability in DES cases. 4 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 18, at 493.
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them-whose identity is unclear-caused the harm.26 Although the
Supreme Court of California in Sindell recognized that these tradi-
tional theories are unsatisfactory in a DES context,'2 7 it neverthe-
less felt that plaintiffs should not be denied recovery for the inju-
ries they had suffered. The court thus created the market share
liability theory, which in effect is a modified version of the alterna-
tive liability theory.
Market share liability, as formulated in the Sindell decision,
permits plaintiffs to recover from DES manufacturers without
identifying the manufacturer of the particular drug that the plain-
tiff's mother consumed. The plaintiff is required to join a sufficient
number of manufacturers in the action to ensure that a "substan-
tial share" of the market is represented.28 Once the plaintiff has
met this duty, the burden of proof shifts to each defendant to es-
tablish that it could not have produced the drug which caused the
harm in question.2 Any defendant who fails to exonerate itself,
therefore, is liable to the plaintiff for her damages,3 0 which are ap-
portioned among the defendants according to each one's relative
market share."' Thus, under the Sindell court's theory, recovery is
permitted through a relaxation of traditional common-law proof
requirements.
The market share liability theory possesses great superficial
appeal. Innocent plaintiffs are allowed to recover, and, since each
defendant's damages are apportioned according to the amount of
harm attributable to it, the defendants seemingly are treated fairly
as well. The Sindell court reasoned that the use of DES to prevent
miscarriage causes harm in a certain percentage of cases. There-
fore, according to the court, a defendant who produced ten percent
of the DES that was placed on the market to prevent miscarriage
statistically would be likely to have caused ten percent of the
harm. Thus, if the court apportioned damages according to each
defendant's market share, then theoretically each defendant would
be held liable only for approximately as much harm as it caused.
This Article examines the market share liability theory to de-
termine whether it can achieve the objective of treating both par-
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
27. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 601-10, 607 P.2d 924, 930-35, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 138-43, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
28. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
31. Id.
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ties fairly. Although courts in the past have relaxed the plaintiff's
burden of proof on the element of causation in fact,32 the question
remains whether this relaxation is appropriate in DES cases, and,
if so, whether market share liability is the most equitable method
of implementing the relaxation. This Article suggests that the mar-
ket share liability theory contains several serious flaws that render
it unsuitable as a means for allowing plaintiffs to recover in DES
cases. The Article criticizes the theory for diluting the elements of
the alternative liability doctrine to the extent that the market
share theory fails to meet the alternative liability theory's primary
objective of allocating responsibility according to each defendant's
share of the fault."3 Moreover, the additional objective of market
share liability-to implement the modern notions of risk spreading
and deterrence that underlie the law of products liability-is not
achieved through the market share theory because the theory's re-
quirements were derived from alternative liability, which was
designed to accomplish a different objective. The Article further
criticizes the theory because it permits courts and juries to resolve
cases without adequate evidence. 4
32. In res ipsa loquitur cases, for example, some courts have relaxed the exclusive
control requirement in those multiple defendant cases in which either the status of the de-
fendant or the relationship of the defendants to the plaintiff justifies the relaxation. See,
e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). Other courts have shifted the
burden of proof to the defendants to apportion damages in those situations in which no
evidence is available to aid the court in making this determination. See, e.g., Maddux v.
Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961); see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS,
supra note 26, § 433B(2).
The alternative liability doctrine, which appears to have had its genesis in the landmark
case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), applies when several defendants
have acted negligently toward the plaintiff-who sustains an injury-and only one of the
defendants could have caused the harm. The theory shifts the burden of proof to the defen-
dants to show that they were not responsible for the injury. Those defendants who are una-
ble to exculpate themselves are jointly and severally liable for all the plaintiff's damages.
See notes 44-71 infra and accompanying text.
The court in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
suggested yet another possible method for recovery-the enterprise liability theory. In Hall
some unidentifiable blasting caps injured several children, and plaintiffs joined all six Amer-
ican manufacturers of blasting caps as defendants. Plaintiffs were not able to identify
which of the defendants had made the blasting caps that caused the injuries to each plain-
tiff. The court imposed joint liability on all defendants, in part because defendants had
adhered to an inadequate industry-wide safety standard. In other words, under the Hall
court's scheme, joint liability is based on joint control over the risk. The enterprise liability
theory has received limited acceptance among the courts, but legal scholars have cited it
widely. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 2, at 995-1007; Note, supra note 6, at 704.
33. For a discussion of the fault system under the alternative liability theory, see notes
93-109 infra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 134-49 infra and accompanying text.
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After an initial examination of the purposes of the causation
in fact requirement, this Article compares the objectives and re-
quirements of alternative liability with those of market share lia-
bility to evaluate the suitability of the latter as a theory of recov-
ery. The Article then examines the requirements of market share
liability and the proof problems in DES cases to determine
whether the doctrine in fact is able from a practical standpoint to
apportion the plaintiff's damages according to each defendant's
share of the market. Finally, the Article discusses the effect of
market share liability on products liability law as a whole.
II. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF MARKET SHARE LiBIrY
A. Purposes of the Causation in Fact Requirement
Both the alternative liability theory and the market share lia-
bility theory relax the traditional principle in tort law which im-
poses upon the plaintiff the burden of proving that the defendant's
action was at least a cause in fact of the injury that the plaintiff
sustained. Therefore, the appropriate way to begin a comparison of
these doctrines is to review briefly the relevant purposes that the
causation in fact requirement serves. Initially, however, it should
be noted that causation in fact is not necessary to further the
traditional tort goals of deterrence and compensation."5 To illus-
trate, suppose a falling tree that had been struck by lightning in-
jured plaintiff. If plaintiff were able to establish that a railroad
company was negligent in failing to equip its locomotive with a
whistle, a court could further the tort policies of compensation and
deterrence by imposing liability for plaintiff's injury upon the rail-
road company, even though no causal connection existed between
the company's negligence and plaintiff's injury. As long as the rail-
road company understood that liability was being imposed upon it
because of its negligence, it would have an incentive to equip its
locomotives properly in the future.3 6 At the same time, requiring
the railroad company to compensate the injured party would fur-
ther society's interest in compensating accident victims. In this
case, however, the railroad company would not be liable because
the plaintiff would be unable to prove a causal connection between
his injury and the company's negligence. Clearly, then, the policies
35. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rlv.
643, 659-60 (1978); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv.
153, 163-65 (1976).
36. Klemme, supra note 35, at 164-65.
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giving rise to causation in fact are not based upon the desirability
of deterrence and compensation.
A major function of the causation in fact requirement is to
limit the scope of potential liability.3 7 Unquestionably, the law
seeks to compensate accident victims and discourage socially unde-
sirable activity, both of which usually can be advanced by impos-
ing liability upon the party at fault. Society's need to protect the
interests of potential defendants, however, must be balanced
against these policies; if a defendant's potential liability is exces-
sive, then its useful conduct might be inhibited along with its un-
desirable behavior. The previous example illustrates this point. If a
railroad could be held liable for the harm that the lightning caused
simply because it had a defective whistle, then it conceivably could
be held liable for any damages that an individual sustained any-
where in the world. The threat of this liability undoubtedly would
discourage people from engaging in railroading and other useful
but potentially dangerous activities. This discouraging effect,
which is clearly undesirable, can be appropriately referred to as
"over-deterrence." Thus, the causation in fact requirement is one
way in which the law limits the scope of liability and attempts to
avoid discouraging socially desirable activity.3 8
The role that the causation in fact requirement plays in limit-
ing the scope of potential liability is an important consideration in
evaluating the effectiveness of the market share liability doctrine.
As explained above, the doctrine permits a defendant to be held
liable for harm that others have caused. To the extent that the
doctrine allows a defendant to be held liable for more harm than it
in fact caused, the theory potentially has an unduly inhibiting
effect.3 9
Causation in fact also serves the function of assessing moral
blame.'0 One of the purposes of tort law is to resolve disputes
among individuals and thereby discourage self-help remedies.4 1 To
achieve this objective, the law must reflect popular notions of
moral responsibility, and people often associate moral blame42 and
37. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 236-37 (4th ed. 1971).
38. W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 237, 239.
39. See part IV infra.
40. H. HART & A. HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 59 (1959); see Malone, Rumina-
tions on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. RaV. 60, 66 (1956).
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 17, 492.
42. H. HART & A. HONORA, supra note 40, at 59-60.
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responsibility"3 with causation in fact. Thus, if X borrows Y's car
and damages it in an accident, both X and Y are likely to feel
intuitively that fairness requires X to repair the damage. This re-
action is to be anticipated even if the accident was not X's fault. Y
typically would consider X responsible for the damage to his car
simply because X was driving when the accident occurred; if X
had not borrowed the car, it presumably would not have been in-
volved in an accident.
This relationship between causation and moral blame can be
illustrated more clearly in the criminal context, since in these cases
the need to compensate the victim does not cloud the issue. As in
civil law, in criminal law personal culpability-such as negligence
or intentional misconduct-provides an independent basis for as-
sessing moral blame. A court can impose criminal responsibility
upon a defendant even in the absence of harm-for example, reck-
less driving and attempted murder. On the other hand, if the con-
duct does result in serious harm, the degree of blame that is at-
tached to that conduct increases proportionately. A reckless driver
whose careless driving kills a child is likely to receive a much more
severe penalty in a prosecution for manslaughter than is a reckless
driver who narrowly avoids hitting the child. Similarly, a criminal
who kills his victim will be punished more harshly in a prosecution
for murder than one who fails. The degree of moral blame, then, is
a function of the antisocial nature of the defendant's act, which
may be referred to as "culpability-based blame," and the amount
of harm that the act causes, which may be referred to as "causal
blame."
The moral blame function of the causation in fact requirement
is useful in an evaluation of the alternative liability and market
share liability theories. Although moral blame is an important ele-
ment of the former theory, it is of little importance to market
share liability because this theory significantly dilutes the elements
of its progenitor.
B. Alternative Liability
The Supreme Court of California adopted the alternative lia-
bility theory in the leading case of Summers v. Tice.4 A number of
other courts have followed the approach,45 and the Restatement
43. Malone, supra note 40, at 66.
44. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
45. See, e.g., Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 98 (1949) and supplements.
1630 [Vol. 34:1623
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(Second) of Torts adopted it in section 433B(3). 4' Defendants in
Summers were two hunters who negligently fired their shotguns in
plaintiff's direction at the same time. Plaintiff was hit in the eye
with a single shotgun pellet, but he was unable to identify the gun
from which the pellet was fired. Under the traditional common-
law rule, plaintiff would have had to establish that a particular de-
fendant was more likely than not the cause of plaintiff's harm.
4
1
Since both defendants were equally likely to have caused the harm,
however, the court's application of this rule would have resulted in
a directed verdict for defendants.4' Thus, the California Supreme
Court in Summers expressly rejected the traditional rule and held
that when one of two or more defendants injures the plaintiff, but
the evidence is insufficient to allow the plaintiff to establish which
of them is the culpable party, then the burden of proof shifts to
the defendants to establish their innocence.' 9 Under the Summers
court's scheme, the plaintiff must join as defendants all those per-
sons who potentially might have caused the harm. In addition,
all the joined defendants must have acted in a tortious manner,51
which typically has meant simple negligence,5 1 even though the Re-
statement rule is broad enough to encompass both intentional and
strict liability torts. If these two requirements are met, then each
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 26, § 433B(3).
47. Id. Comment a.
48. Commentators had criticized this result in advance of the Summers case. See
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 441-42 (1937). Some
courts had avoided the outcome by straining to find liability under a concert of action the-
ory. See, e.g., Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1926).
49. 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
50. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981); Namm v. Charles
E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 26, § 433B(3), Comment h; Note, Manufacturers' Liability Based on a
Market Share Theory: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 16 TuLsA L.J. 286, 291 (1980); 94
HAxv. L. REv. 668, 672 (1981); 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 139, 143 (1981).
51. Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973); Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d
654, 226 P.2d 574 (1951); Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843
(1978); Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 448 P.2d 653 (1968); Derouen v. American Employ-
ers Ins. Co., 118 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1960); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J.
Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 243; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS, supra note 26, § 433B(3), Comment g.
52. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973); Raber v. Tumin, 36
Cal. 2d 654, 226 P.2d 574 (1951); Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 843 (1978); Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 448 P.2d 653 (1968); Derouen v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 118 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1960).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 26, § 433B(3). The Restatement
provision applies to "tortious" conduct. Section 6 of the Restatement defines this conduct
broadly enough to include any conduct that is sufficient to subject an actor to liability in
tort.
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defendant must prove that he did not cause the harm or else be
jointly and severally liable with the other defendants for the full
amount of the plaintiff's damages."
Some courts have indicated that additional requirements must
be met for a plaintiff to recover under an alternative liability the-
ory. The Summers court itself, for example, apparently would re-
quire that the defendants must be in a better position than the
plaintiff to offer evidence on the issue of causation.5  Authority
also exists for the proposition that the burden of proof will not
shift unless the defendants are responsible for the plaintiff's inabil-
ity to prove causation.58 Other courts, however, have not required
either of these elements.
57
Alternative liability is a fault-based doctrine58 in the sense
that moral blame attaches under the theory once the defendants
have failed to prove their innocence. Indeed, many authorities ap-
pear to rely upon the defendant's moral blame as a major justifica-
tion for the imposition of liability. In Summers, for example, the
court stated, "[T]hey are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward
plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the negligence of
one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them
each to absolve himself if he can. 59 Similarly, the reporters for
the Restatement in their official comments declared that it would
be an injustice to permit "proved wrongdoers, who among them
have inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff to es-
cape liability merely because the nature of their conduct and the
resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of
them has caused the harm."'60 Other authorities point out the un-
fairness of allowing an entirely innocent plaintiff to go without a
remedy even though one of two proven wrongdoers clearly caused
the harm.61 These courts and commentators view the alternative
54. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948).
55. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. See also Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C.
1981); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div.
1981).
56. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981); Namm v.
Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div. 1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) or ToRTs, supra note 26, § 433B(3), Comment f.
57. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980); Ferrigno
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980).
58. See Note, supra note 6, at 705.
59. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, supra note 26, § 433B, Comment f.
61. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 73, 289 N.W.2d 20, 25 (1980); A. BECHT
& F. MuxL, THE TEST OF FACTuAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRIar LuBnurry CASES
1632 [Vol34:1623
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liability theory as a means of circumventing the traditional burden
of proof requirement, which they consider to be a technicality that
is an impediment to justice in situations giving rise to alternative
liability.
The fairness argument is particularly compelling in these situ-
ations because moral blame is usually quite prevalent: the plaintiff
has been injured and at least one of the defendants is responsible.
The Summers case provides a perfect example because both ele-
ments of moral blame-culpability-based and causal blame-were
present.62 Culpability-based blame was present because each de-
fendant's conduct was unquestionably of an antisocial nature.
Causal blame existed because one of the defendants clearly caused
the harm, and plaintiff suffered a severe injury. In fact, the pres-
ence of causal blame in alternative liability cases is particularly
crucial. Courts routinely deny recovery in cases in which the causal
blame factor is diminished, as in those cases in which no basis ex-
ists for deciding whether a negligent defendant or an innocent
source caused the harm in question. 3
Clearly, then, the alternative liability theory does not defeat
the functions of the causation in fact requirement for liability in
tort. Allocation of responsibility according to moral blame admit-
tedly is diluted under the doctrine, but it is not significantly im-
paired. As stated above, a plaintiff under the traditional rule must
prove that the existence of causation is more probable than not."
In other words, the probability that the defendant's conduct was at
least a cause in fact of the harm in question must be greater than
fifty percent. In the typical alternative liability case with two
joined defendants, the probability that each caused the harm is ex-
actly fifty percent.6 5 The alternative liability theory thus requires
only a slight reduction in the degree of proof that the courts tradi-
tionally have required on the issue of causation in fact. If a fifty-
one percent probability of causation is sufficient to impute blame,
then a fifty percent probability of causation should also be suffi-
cient, even though the degree of culpability may be reduced. When
three defendants are involved in the action, the probability that
each caused the harm is lowered to one-third. This situation dic-
105 (1961); W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 243; Malone, supra note 40, at 83-84.
62. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
63. RzSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 26, § 433B(1), Comment a, Illustra-
tion 2.
64. Id. § 433B, Comment a.
65. A. BECHT & F. MmLER, supra note 61, at 104.
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tates a much greater relaxation of the burden of proof,6 but the
probability of causation is still high enough to impute some causal
blame to all three defendants.
To illustrate, if a single hunter negligently fires in the direc-
tion of the plaintiff, but no harm results, most people intuitively
would perceive his conduct as less culpable than if he had hit the
plaintiff. On the other hand, if the hunter actually wounds the
plaintiff, the existence of harm, which his negligence has caused,
would significantly alter his situation. The position of each hunter
in Summers is far more analogous to the single hunter who hits the
plaintiff than to the one who misses him. In Summers plaintiff
sustained a serious injury because of someone's culpable conduct;
the only question was which of the two defendants caused the
harm. When considered separately, a substantial chance existed
that each hunter caused the harm.6 7 That only one of them actu-
ally was responsible for the injury does not seriously mitigate the
moral blame that is attached to each hunter because of his culpa-
ble conduct and the resultant serious harm to the plaintiff.
As stated above, an important function of the causation in fact
requirement is to restrict the scope of potential liability. 8 The
alternative liability theory does not contravene this function;
rather, it sufficiently limits the number of potential defendants
and avoids the problem of excessive liability. Alternative liability
cases almost always contain only a small number of defendants
who possibly are responsible for just one specific injury.6 9 A partic-
ular defendant's conduct in these cases typically could have caused
the injury even if the other defendants had not acted. Moreover,
the traditional tort principles of duty and proximate cause apply
to limit further a defendant's potential exposure. Thus, the doc-
trine of alternative liability is highly unlikely to subject an inordi-
nate number of defendants to excessive liability.
The alternative liability theory does not apply in most DES
cases because of the large number of potential defendants, which
courts and commentators have estimated to be between ninety-
four and three hundred manufacturers.7 0 To join as defendants all
66. Id. at 105.
67. Id. at 104.
68. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Eaton, 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973); Garcia v. Joseph Vince
Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978); Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 448
P.2d 653 (1968).
70. Comment, supra note 2, at 964 n.3; Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super.
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manufacturers that might have supplied DES to the plaintiff's
mother clearly would be impractical in many cases.7 1 Plaintiffs in
such cases thus are unable to meet the requirements for establish-
ing alternative liability, even though they otherwise might be enti-
tled to receive compensation for their injuries. This practical prob-
lem is precisely what led the courts to formulate the market share
liability theory.
C. Market Share Liability
Both the market share and alternative liability theories oper-
ate under at least one common policy, which the Sindell court
summarized as follows: "[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury. "72
In creating market share liability, however, the California Supreme
Court modified the traditional alternative liability theory and
adapted it to DES cases."3 Under the Sindell court's scheme, a
plaintiff need only join a sufficient number of manufacturers to re-
present a "substantial share" of the market.7 ' Once the plaintiff
has met this threshold requirement, the burden of proof shifts to
each defendant to exculpate itself by showing that it could not
have supplied the offending drug.7 5 Those defendants that are un-
able to prove their innocence are liable for the plaintiff's damages.
The court in Sindell, however, recognized that holding each of the
five remaining defendants jointly and severally liable for all plain-
tiff's harm would have been unfair, since only ten of the approxi-
mately two hundred manufacturers originally were joined in the
action. In view of the large number of manufacturers, the Sindell
court reasoned that there "may be a substantial likelihood" that
none of them supplied the drug which caused plaintiff's harm.76 To
overcome this difficulty, the Sindell court held that each defen-
551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980) (287 companies marketed DES).
71. Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div.
1981); see Comment, supra note 2, at 991, 996; Note, supra note 23, at 1003-06; 38 WASH. &
LEE L. REv., supra note 50, at 144.
An exceptional case is Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980).
The court in Abel held that plaintiff stated a cause of action under alternative liability by
alleging that all manufacturers that distributed DES in the jurisdiction in which plaintiff's
mother took the drug were joined as defendants. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
72. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
73. Id. at 598-99, 610, 607 P.2d at 928, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136, 144.
74. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
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dant would be liable only for "the proportion of the judgment rep-
resented by its share of the market."' 7 Underlying the court's rea-
soning is the notion that although market share liability might not
effect a correct matching of plaintiffs and defendants in each case,
each defendant ultimately will be held liable only for the amount
of harm that it statistically was likely to have caused. 8
The requirements of market share and alternative liability are
closely analogous. The alternative liability theory requires joinder
of all possible wrongdoers to ensure that the actual wrongdoer is
before the court. Similarly, the market share theory requires the
plaintiff to join a sufficient number of defendants to reflect a "sub-
stantial share" of the market, which increases the likelihood that
the responsible party is before the court .7 Under the latter theory,
the damage apportionment rules are changed to compensate for
the lack of certainty about whether the plaintiff has joined the true
wrongdoer. Both theories, however, shift the burden of proof on
the issue of causation to the defendants, and both permit the de-
fendants to exculpate themselves upon a proper showing.
Despite these similarities, the question remains whether the
market share liability theory actually can promote the policy that
underlies both theories. This policy permits an injured plaintiff to
recover from a defendant who was clearly negligent, but whose
conduct cannot be directly linked to-or separated from-the
plaintiff's injury. An evaluation of the actual success or failure of
the market share theory is possible only after careful scrutiny of
the rationales upon which the two theories rest, for only then do
the incongruent aspects of the separate doctrines surface.
Alternative liability, according to some authorities, is justifia-
ble in part because the defendants in such situations typically are
in a better position to offer evidence on the causation issue than is
the plaintiff;80 these authorities, therefore, reason that the defen-
dants should be forced to come forward with their evidence. Manu-
facturers in DES cases, on the other hand, often are not in a better
position than the plaintiff to prove the origin of the drug that the
77. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
78. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. A law review comment, which
analyzed the DES problem and suggested a novel theory of enterprise liability, greatly influ-
enced the Sindell court in its development of market share liability. See Comment, supra
note 2. While the court did not strictly follow every suggestion that the student made, it did
adopt many of them.
79. Comment, supra note 2, at 996; 11 STON HALL L. Rxv. 610, 625 (1981); 20 WASH-
BURN L.J. 468, 476 & n.60 (1981).
80. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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plaintiff's mother consumed, especially since drug companies nor-
mally deal only indirectly with consumers and do not know which
ones have purchased their products."1 Although the California Su-
preme Court in Sindell determined that the difference in the two
theories on the question of the availability of proof to the defen-
dants was not an appropriate justification for denying imposition
of its new theory,82 other courts since Sindell have expressly relied
on this distinction to avoid applying market share liability in DES
cases.
83
A related rationale for the alternative liability theory is that
the burden of proof should be shifted because the defendants' neg-
ligence created the plaintiff's inability to prove causation." The
Sindell court, however, rejected this argument in the DES context
on the ground that defendants could not have foreseen that their
negligence in producing a defective product without adequate
warnings eventually would present plaintiff with an availability of
proof problem.85 The court reasoned that the principal cause of
plaintiff's inability to prove causation was not defendants' negli-
gence, but the time lapse between the mother's consumption of the
drug and the appearance of a disorder in her offspring.8 8 Thus, two
justifications that some authorities give for the alternative liability
theory do not provide support for the market share doctrine, even
though the latter ostensibly is derived from the former.
The market share liability theory relaxes the plaintiff's burden
of proof on the issue of causation to a greater degree than do most
alternative liability cases. Thus, the doctrine has greater potential
for frustrating the underlying purposes of the causation in fact re-
quirement. It is axiomatic that increasing the number of potential
defendants greatly reduces the probability that any given defen-
dant caused the harm.8 7 Unlike alternative liability cases in which
the probability that a particular defendant caused the plaintiff's
81. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 600-01, 607 P.2d 924, 929-30, 163
Cal. Rptr., 132, 137-38, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co.,
178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div. 1981); Henderson, supra note 10, at 147.
82. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 600, 607 P.2d 924, 929, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 137, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
83. Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div.
1981).
84. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
85. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 601, 607 P.2d 924, 930, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 138, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
86. Id. See also Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121
(App. Div. 1981); Note, supra note 23, at 1007-09.
87. Comment, supra note 2, at 997.
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harm is usually at least one-half or one-third,88 the likelihood that
any given defendant in a market share liability case actually was
responsible for the plaintiff's injury may be very slight. With one
hundred defendants, the probability that each caused the harm is
reduced to one percent.8 9 Indeed, market share liability relaxes the
burden of proof well beyond this point, since several hundred man-
ufacturers may have produced the product, and any one of them
may have caused the harm in a given case. Obviously, this
probability remains the same whether the plaintiff joins all DES
manufacturers or only five of them.
The market share liability theory can be placed in proper per-
spective only by analyzing it in light of the relevant purposes that
the causation requirement serves. One of these purposes is to limit
the scope of potential liability and avoid discouraging socially use-
ful activity.90 If market share liability operates as the Sindell court
envisioned that it would, this function of the causation require-
ment will not be thwarted. The market share doctrine theoretically
protects defendants from excessive liability by limiting their po-
tential exposure in proportion to the amount of DES that they sold
for the purpose of preventing miscarriage. Presumably, then, no
defendant will be held liable for more harm than it actually
caused, which is as much protection as the causation in fact re-
quirement can hope to provide.9 1 In practice, however, it is ques-
tionable whether a defendant can be assured under the market
share theory that his potential liability will be so predictably cir-
cumscribed. As will be discussed in more detail below,92 the practi-
cal and procedural problems inherent in implementing the doc-
trine are so great that damages are unlikely to be limited to the
amount of harm that the defendant caused.
Another purpose of the causation in fact requirement is to
cause courts and juries to impose liability on the basis of moral
blame.93 This purpose is well served under the alternative liability
theory because it is a fault-based doctrine; its reliance upon causal
blame is not impaired significantly by the relatively modest relaxa-
88. See notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
89. R. EPSTmN, supra note 6, at 156.
90. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
91. Moreover, other traditional limitations on liability such as the requirement of a
defect and proximate cause apply to DES cases and possibly could cut off liability short of
this point.
92. See part III infra.
93. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
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tion of the proof of causation standard that results when a typi-
cally small number of defendants-at least one of whom actually
caused the harm to the plaintiff-are held liable for the plaintiff's
injury.9 4 Under the market share theory, however, the plaintiff may
not have even joined the actual wrongdoer.9 5 In this situation,
which is likely to occur quite frequently, there is less blame to
spread among the defendants because any uncertainty that the
manufacturer which caused the harm has been joined as a defen-
dant will eliminate causal blame from the equation to the extent of
the uncertainty. 6
The degree to which causal blame is diluted in this manner in
market share cases will depend upon the definition that the court
gives to the phrase "a substantial share" of the market. If, for
example, the court holds that manufacturers representing fifty per-
cent of the DES market constitute "a substantial share," then only
fifty percent of the blame-and one-half of the plaintiff's dam-
ages-can be attributed to these manufacturers in an action in
which they are all joined. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of
California in Sindell failed to define the phrase "a substantial
share." A law review comment that significantly influenced the
court's decision, however, suggested that the plaintiff should be re-
quired to join enough manufacturers to create "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" that one of the joined defendants manufactured the
product which caused the plaintiff's injury.97 The comment pro-
posed that joinder of seventy-five to eighty percent of the manu-
facturers in the market would satisfy this standard.9 8 The Sindell
court, however, rejected this figure as too high and held that "only
.a substantial percentage is required."99 This statement implies that
a lower percentage than seventy-five percent of the market has to
be joined to constitute "a substantial share,"10 though how much
less is unclear. In any event, if the percentage of defendants that
must be joined is reduced, then the total amount of blame that can
be attributed to these defendants is diminished proportionately.
94. See text accompanying notes 40-43 & 58-67 supra.
95. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 603, 607 P.2d 924, 931, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 139, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
96. See, e.g., A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 61, at 106; Comment, supra note 2, at
996-97.
97. Comment, supra note 2, at 995.
98. Id. at 996.
99. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
100. 59 WAsH. U.L.Q. 571, 583 (1981).
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The countervailing argument to the one that advocates joinder
of a high percentage of manufacturing companies is based on
plaintiff's allegation in Sindell that only five or six manufacturers
represent ninety percent of the DES market.110 According to this
argument, joinder of these manufacturers will ensure that at least
ninety percent of the blame which the harmful occurrence gener-
ated will be attributable-at least statistically-to the defendants.
In this scenario, the argument continues, market share liability will
not differ significantly from alternative liability. Even if the allega-
tion can be established, this position is untenable for two principal
reasons. First, the market share liability theory does not require
that all large manufacturers be joined as defendants; it only re-
quires joinder of a sufficient number of manufacturers to represent
"a substantial share" of the market. Second, market share liability
apparently is applicable to all products liability cases that deal
with fungible goods, not just those in which DES is the allegedly
defective product.10 2 Few markets in fungible goods, however, will
be structured like the DES market. Thus, while the dominance of
a few firms may prevent a significant dilution of causal blame in
some DES cases, no guarantee exists that it will do so in cases con-
cerning other fungible goods-or even in all DES cases.
Causal blame also is diluted in a second way. Even if the
plaintiff were required to join all manufacturers who might possi-
bly have caused the harm, the large number of DES manufacturers
reduces the amount of blame attributable to each individual defen-
dant. 03 Causal blame necessarily is proportionate to the degree of
certainty that the actor caused the harm. Thus, causal blame is
very high in cases in which a defendant unquestionably caused an
injury and very low when there is only a slight possibility that the
defendant caused the harm. In most general tort cases, a "more
likely than not" standard, which usually is sufficient to generate
causal blame, is used. In a typical alternative liability case, when
there are only two or three defendants, a somewhat lower standard
of proof is used; causal blame is attributable to each defendant be-
cause of the significant likelihood that each of the defendants
caused the harm. In DES cases, however, a possible 300 manufac-
turers could be joined as defendants. Most of the manufacturers
commanded only a small portion of the relevant market. Thus,
101. SindeU v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
102. See notes 156-66 infra and accompanying text.
103. See A. BECHT & F. MMLER, supra note 61, at 105; Comment, supra note 2, at 996.
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only a small chance exists that one of them caused a given plain-
tiff's harm. Therefore, the amount of causal blame attributable to
these manufacturers is quite low. Nonetheless, these manufactur-
ers will be held liable under market share liability if they are
joined as defendants.
Causal blame cannot be invoked to justify the imposition of
liability against the many defendant manufacturers in DES cases
because the probability that a particular defendant caused the
harm is too minimal to generate feelings of culpability. If disclo-
sure of the facts engenders sentiments of blame toward such a de-
fendant, that blame must be based on the defendant's failure to
take actions such as adequately testing the drug, not on any no-
tions of causation of harm. The defendant's failure to take such
actions subjects it to culpability-based blame-blame based solely
on antisocial conduct-rather than causal blame.
Plaintiffs in DES cases can argue that causal blame justifies
market share liability because even though the blame attributable
to a particular defendant may be small, the sum of the blame at-
tributable to all manufacturers-whether or not they are joined as
defendants-nevertheless equals one hundred percent; a defen-
dant, therefore, must pay for only the percentage of harm that it
statistically could have caused. Under this reasoning, the dilution
of causal blame that is attributable to a given defendant is coun-
terbalanced by the corresponding dilution of liability. As will be
discussed below, however, this argument incorrectly assumes that
the market share liability theory can effectively achieve a fair ap-
portionment of damages based on the defendants' market share.
T10
Of course, the imposition of moral blame may be based par-
tially on the antisocial nature of the defendants' conduct. Although
the plaintiffs in market share liability cases can argue effectively
that the manufacturers were negligent,10 5 the defendants in these
cases can make equally good arguments to the contrary,10 6 and ju-
ries have decided both ways.107 Even if one assumes negligence on
the part of the defendants, however, the defendants still can argue
persuasively that they were marketing what they initially thought
was a socially desirable product, which only subsequently was dis-
104. See generally part IH infra.
105. Comment, supra note 2, at 971 n.25; 94 HARv. L. RE V., supra note 50, at 669.
106. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 621, 607 P.2d 924, 942-43, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 150-51 (Richardson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Note,
supra note 6, at 723; Note, supra note 50, at 312.
107. 94 HARV. L. REv., supra note 50, at 674 n.37.
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covered to be defective. Thus, these defendants might argue, their
conduct was not sufficiently antisocial'018 to justify relaxing the nor-
mal burden of proof requirement concerning causation in fact.
Whether the courts should exercise their power to relax the
plaintiff's burden of proof in market share liability cases is essen-
tially a policy question. Market share liability relaxes the plain-
tiff's burden to a much greater degree than alternative liability;
therefore, the risk of over-deterrence is increased for products
such as nondefective generic drugs that normally are beneficial.
Consequently, the relaxation of the plaintiff's burden of proof
under the market share liability theory may not be justified.10 9
Since damages under the market share theory are apportioned ac-
cording to each defendant's share of the market, a major argument
in favor of relaxing the plaintiff's burden is that the defendant's
liability exposure is also reduced. Whether the defendant's liabil-
ity exposure actually can be reduced as a practical matter is con-
sidered in part III of this Article.
III. PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES UNDER THE MARKET SHARE
LIABILITY THEORY
A primary justification which is typically given for market
share liability is that all defendants are treated equitably under
the theory, since liability is apportioned according to each defen-
dant's share of the market."" The true test of the theory's effec-
tiveness, however, is whether this apportionment can be imple-
mented as a practical matter. This part of the Article maintains
that a number of practical and procedural difficulties render it un-
likely that the doctrine can accurately apportion damages based on
an approximation of each defendant's share of the market.
A. Divergent Views on the Definition of the "Relevant
Market" and Lack of Uniformity Among the Courts
What constitutes the relevant market for the purpose of deter-
mining a particular defendant's market share can affect signifi-
cantly the percentage of liability that is attributable to a given de-
fendant. Suppose, for example, that plaintiff's mother purchased
all her DES from one Illinois pharmacy, which filled its DES pre-
108. Malone, supra note 40, at 84; Note, supra note 6, at 723.
109. See generally part IV infra.
110. Comment, supra note 2, at 999; 11 SETON HALL L. REv., supra note 79, at 623.
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scriptions exclusively from five manufacturers. Suppose also that
the pharmacist cannot recall which brand of DES he used to fill
the mother's prescription. Finally, assume that defendant X, one
of the pharmacy's five providers, supplied thirty percent of the
DES marketed in Illinois, but only ten percent of the DES sold
nationally. Defendant X's market share, therefore, will be either
ten percent, twenty percent,111 or thirty percent, depending upon
whether the relevant market is defined on a national, local (phar-
macy-level), or statewide basis.
A major weakness of the Sindell decision is the court's failure
to indicate how the relevant market should be defined.112 On the
one hand, the court could have intended that different definitions
should apply to different cases; on the other hand, it might have
contemplated that a uniform rule should apply to all cases. Thus,
in the absence of any direct guidance from the courts, the proper
analytical approach is to determine which definition is the most
appropriate for market share liability cases. In the example above,
the local market (pharmacy-level) is the most appealing standard
because it most closely approaches the probability that each defen-
dant supplied the offending drug.1 Unfortunately, in many cases
evidence of the local market share will not be available because the
pharmacists have failed to keep sufficiently detailed records in
their files for extended periods of time. If this evidence were un-
available, then the court would be forced either to dismiss the
plaintiff's cause of action or to resort to another definition of the
relevant market. If the court chose the latter option, the new defi-
nition of the relevant market again would have to depend at least
in part on the type and quantity of available information. If the
court's definition of the relevant market varies from case to case
according to the proof available, then the inevitably conflicting de-
cisions are certain to yield inconsistent results. This difference in
results would transform the market share liability theory into a
lottery based on the fortuity of the availability of evidence in a
particular case. If a defendant's proportionate share of the liability
is permitted to vary widely from one case to another solely because
111. This result assumes that each of the five manufacturers sold equal amounts of
DES to the pharmacist. Thus, each manufacturer would have a 20% share of the market
that the pharmacy served.
112. Birnbaum, Market Share Liability Under California's Sindell DES Decision,
NAT'L L.J., May 19, 1980, 26 col. 1, 27 col. 1; see 11 SETON HALL L. REv., supra note 79, at -
622.
113. 11 SEroN HALL L. REV., supra note 79, at 622.
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of the amount of proof on hand, then the market share theory's
ultimate goal of apportioning liability fairly according to each de-
fendant's market share will be unattainable.
A better approach to this problem is to formulate a single defi-
nition of the relevant market and apply it uniformly in all cases.
This approach, however, can succeed only if a broad defini-
tion-such as a national or statewide market-is formulated. If a
more specific definition were used, plaintiffs in many cases would
be hard pressed to present sufficient proof to satisfy this standard.
A general definition that is uniformly applied is far more likely to
result ultimately in a fair apportionment of damages.
Even if courts were to apply a broad, uniform definition of the
relevant market, another element of the market share theory could
seriously impair the court's efforts to impose liability on defen-
dants in an equitable manner. According to the court in Sindell, a
defendant can escape liability entirely by showing that it could not
have produced the DES which caused the plaintiff's harm. This
element also is certain to result in inconsistent determinations of a
given defendant's proportionate liability. Assume that two cases
arise in a jurisdiction that applies a uniform definition of relevant
market, and that the same twenty manufacturers are joined as de-
fendants in both cases. In the first case, the evidence shows that
the DES came from one of five defendants; in the second case no
such exculpatory evidence exists. In the first case, under the mar-
ket share liability theory, the action against fifteen defendants
must be dismissed, and the remaining five defendants must pay all
the plaintiff's damages, 114 In the second case, all twenty defendants
will have to pay their full market share under the normal defini-
tion of relevant market. The combination of the two cases will re-
sult in the five defendants paying more than their market
share-according to the uniform definition-and the fifteen paying
less than their market share.111 In other words, in the first case the
five defendants paid more than their market share, while in the
second case they paid their full market share. Likewise, the other
fifteen defendants paid their full market share in the second case
but paid nothing in the first. Moreover, because of factors such as
time lapses the presence of exculpatory evidence is largely fortui-
tous. The net result is that defendants' liability in DES cases will
114. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
115. 94 HARv. L. R.v., supra note 50, at 675-76.
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fluctuate according to the availability of proof rather than the cul-
pability of their conduct.
B. The Requirement That the Defendants Pay the Entire
Judgment
Although the court in Sindell was unclear on this point, the
decision arguably requires that defendants pay one hundred per-
cent of the plaintiff's damages even though these defendants may
represent less than one hundred percent of the market, a require-
ment which inherently distorts the defendants' actual liability.
The court in Sindell stated, "Each defendant will be held liable for
the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that
market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the
product which caused plaintiff's injuries." 116 This language can be
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the language can be
construed to mean that if the plaintiff joins manufacturers repre-
senting sixty percent of the market, she will only recover sixty per-
cent of her damages. On the other hand, the statement could
mean that the defendants must pay one hundred percent of the
judgment, but that their liability will be apportioned according to
their relative share of the market.118 The latter interpretation ap-
pears to articulate the rule that the court in Sindell intended to
adopt.119 The majority opinion stated that once plaintiff met her
burden of joining "a substantial share" of the relevant market, de-
fendants could file a cross-complaint 2 ° against other DES manu-
facturers that may have supplied the defective product. This state-
ment implies that the court intended the joined defendants to be
116. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
117. Note, supra note 6, at 721.
118. Id.
119. Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants,
30 CATH. U.L. REV. 551, 574 (1981); Note, supra note 6, at 721; 11 SETON HALL L. REV.,
supra note 79, at 621.
120. In California a cross-complaint can operate as an impleader. CAL. CIv. PROc.
CODE § 428.10(b) (West 1973). Section 428.10(b) provides in pertinent part,
A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint or cross-
complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth...
(b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon,
whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action
asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a




held liable for one hundred percent of the damages, since defen-
dants have no apparent reason to cross-complain against third par-
ties except to seek contribution; a right to contribution exists only
in cases in which the joined defendants may be held liable for more
than their pro rata share of the judgment.12 1 In addition, the dis-
senting judge in Sindell interpreted the majority opinion to re-
quire defendants to pay the entire amount of the damages. The
majority did not disavow this interpretation, although it did com-
ment on other aspects of the dissent.
122
The inherent distortion of defendants' actual liability under
the market share liability theory is best illustrated by a hypotheti-
cal. Assume that plaintiff's damages are $100,000, and she joins
enough DES manufacturers to represent sixty percent of the rele-
vant market. Defendant X occupies twenty percent of the relevant
market and one-third of the market that all joined defendants re-
present. If each defendant is liable only for the percentage of the
judgment that is equivalent to its share of the relevant market,
then defendant X would be liable for twenty percent of the dam-
ages, or $20,000.123 If defendants are required to pay one hundred
percent of the judgment, however, then defendant X must pay
one-third of the judgment, or $33,333, which is equivalent to one-
third of the market that all the joined defendants represent. 124 In
other words, defendant X would have to pay sixty-seven percent
($13,333) more than its share of the relevant market.
Plaintiffs can respond to the distortion argument by contend-
ing that defendants are free to bring in third party defendants by
cross-complaint if they wish to have a larger market share repre-
sented in the suit.12 5 The problem with this response is that many
manufacturers may not be amenable to suit in the jurisdiction
where the plaintiff brings the action. 128 For example, some DES
manufacturers intentionally catered to local and regional mar-
121. See, e.g., E.B. Willis Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 128 Cal. Rptr.
541 (1976).
122. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613 n.30, 607 P.2d 924, 938 n.30,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 146 n. 30, (Richardson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
123. See 11 SETON HALL L. REV., supra note 79, at 624.
124. Id.
125. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
126. Note, supra note 6, at 721-22; 59 WASH. U.L.Q., supra note 101, at 583; 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REV., supra note 50, at 141-42. Market share liability does not require that the
plaintiff be injured in California in order to bring suit in California. In fact, one plaintiff in
Sindell was from Florida, and the other was from Illinois. See Note, supra note 6, at 721.
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kets.127 Therefore, a manufacturer who produced a high percentage
of the DES used in the locality where the plaintiff's mother ob-
tained the drug may not do business in the jurisdiction where suit
is filed.128 Nevertheless, the plaintiff still will be able to recover one
hundred percent of her damages from the defendants subject to
suit in that jurisdiction as long as they represent "a substantial
share" of the market that is applicable to her.
Clearly, then, the court's definition of a substantial market
share will directly affect the degree to which the defendants' liabil-
ity is distorted. The lower the percentage of the market that is
required to be joined, the higher will be the resulting distortion. 12 9
In the example above, defendant X, who represented twenty per-
cent of the market, would have to pay one-third of the judgment if
the court required that defendants representing at least sixty per-
cent of the market must be joined. If only enough defendants to
represent forty percent of the market must be joined, however,
then a defendant with twenty percent of the market share would
have to pay fifty percent of the damages. On the other hand, if the
court requires that defendants representing seventy-five percent of
the market share must be joined, then the defendant would have
to pay only twenty-seven percent of the judgment. Thus, the de-
gree of distortion is directly proportional to the percentage of the
market that is required to be joined. The California courts have
yet to provide a figure for future courts to use in deciding what
constitutes "a substantial share," and it remains unclear whether
courts will adopt a uniform measure or permit the trial courts to
use their own definitions on an ad hoc basis.130
C. Limited Acceptance of the Doctrine
The market share liability theory has not been well received
by courts in other states. In fact, some recent DES cases have ex-
pressly refused to adopt the doctrine.131 If the theory continues to
be accepted on a limited basis, further distortions will result. If
only a few states accept it, then liability will fall unevenly upon the
manufacturers that are amenable to suit in those states.32 Since
127. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 159.
128. See Note, supra note 6, at 721.
129. 11 SEroN HALL L. R.v., supra note 79, at 624.
130. Id. at 621.
131. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Namm v. Charles E.
Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div. 1981).
132. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 617, 607 P.2d 924, 940, 163 Cal.
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the doctrine appears to require that the joined defendants pay one
hundred percent of the plaintiff's damages regardless of whether
these defendants collectively represent one hundred percent of the
market,"' those manufacturers who are subject to jurisdiction in
California, for example, will have to pay the entire amount of the
plaintiff's damages-even though in some of the cases manufactur-
ers who are not amenable to suit may have caused the harm.
D. Problems of Proof
The possibility that sufficient evidence will be available to pre-
sent a complete and accurate picture of the relative market share
of all DES manufacturers may be nonexistent in many cases.
134
Many manufacturers may not have kept accurate records, and the
time lapse between the marketing of the drug and the bringing of
the action exacerbates this problem.3 5 Moreover, many of the
records that at one time did exist may have been lost or destroyed
by the time the lawsuit was filed. Furthermore, since DES was
marketed for a variety of uses,""' raw production figures-even if
available-may not reflect accurately the amount of DES that was
produced for the purpose of preventing miscarriage.
The large number of DES manufacturers also contributes to
the availability of proof problem. A given defendant's market share
can be ascertained only by comparing the amount of DES that it
produced for the purpose of preventing miscarriage with the total
amount of DES that all other manufacturers produced for the
same purpose. Under normal circumstances, neither of these statis-
tics would be readily available or easy to gather. To complicate
matters, the number of manufacturers who produced DES for the
purpose of preventing miscarriage also may be unclear.13 7 Even if
Rptr. 132, 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 'Birnbaum,
supra note 112, at 27; 11 SETON HALL L. REV., supra note 79, at 621.
133. See notes 116-30 supra and accompanying text.
134. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612-13, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); R. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 159.
135. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612-13, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); 11 SETON HALL L. REV., supra note 79, at
622.
136. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612-13, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J.
Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div. 1981); R. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 159; Note, supra
note 119, at 556.
137. Comment, supra note 2, at 964 n.3. Estimates range from 94 to 300. Id. Sindell
states that approximately 200 manufacturers produced DES. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 602, 609, 607 P.2d 924, 931, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139, 143, cert. denied,
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they could all be identified, some of these manufacturers may have
either inadequate records or no records at all. Others may have
gone out of business, and their records may have been destroyed. 38
Furthermore, even if raw production data for all other companies
were available, coordinating the data with the definition of the
"relevant market" would be very difficult, since some manufactur-
ers may have catered to national markets and others may have
pursued regional ones," ' not to mention that these markets may
have shifted over time as circumstances changed. °
The Sindell court implied that a plaintiff operates under a re-
laxed standard of proof in establishing a defendant's market share.
Thus, even in cases in which inadequate evidence is available, the
plaintiff nevertheless will be permitted to recover. The court, how-
ever, did not articulate the extent to which it was willing to relax
the standard of proof. It acknowledged the impossibility of proving
the defendant's market share with "mathematical exactitude,"141
but it concluded that this difficulty does not justify an outright
rejection of market share liability.14 2 Quoting from the Summers
opinion, the court stated that "'the trier of fact may make [the
determination] the best it can.' ,143 The California Supreme Court
in Summers explained this phrase by pointing out that the
factfinder's decision is "more or less a guess, [which stresses] the
factor that wrongdoers are not in a position to complain of uncer-
tainty." 4 This language provides some indication that the Sindell
court intended to relax the normal standard of proof considerably,
which, in the absence of adequate evidence, would allow the jury to
determine a defendant's market share by resorting to speculation.
The validity of this interpretation, however, remains to be seen.
Certainly, the plaintiff must produce some evidence of the defen-
dant's market share, but how much evidence is not clear.
Relaxing the burden of proof on the market share issue and
requiring the defendants to exculpate themselves will cause serious
problems in those cases in which some of the relevant evidence is
449 U.S. 912 (1980). Some estimates may be larger than others because they include distrib-
utors of DES that other companies manufactured. Comment, supra note 2, at 964 n.3.
138. Note, supra note 50, at 308.
139. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 159.
140. Id.
141. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948)).
144. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948).
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more readily available to the plaintiff than to the defendants. In
this situation a plaintiff-knowing that she is operating under a
relaxed burden of proof-will often lack the incentive to develop or
produce certain evidence. Moreover, since wholesalers and retailers
over whom DES manufacturers had no contro 14 5 marketed DES as
a generic drug,146 the manufacturers often will be unable to deter-
mine whether the DES that they produced was the DES which was
actually prescribed to and consumed by the plaintiff's mother. On
the other hand, the plaintiff's mother might have information that
is relevant-for example, the place where the prescription was
filled or the size and color of the DES tablets that she consumed.
The plaintiff in some situations actually may have an incen-
tive to suppress probative evidence. If the manufacturer that
caused the harm is insolvent, for example, a plaintiff who can es-
tablish that the manufacturer sold the DES to her mother will be
in a worse position than a plaintiff who cannot. The plaintiff who
can prove the wrongdoer's identity would recover nothing,1 47 while
the plaintiff who fails to present any proof would recover all her
damages from the joined defendants under the market share liabil-
ity theory. This anomaly provides a plaintiff with an incentive to
suppress evidence which indicates that an insolvent company sup-
plied the product.' 48 In fact, the plaintiff may have no motivation
to do anything other than present very minimal evidence on the
market share issue and allow the burden to shift to the defendants
to absolve themselves. If a defendant cannot meet its bur-
den-either because the evidence does not exist or is not made
available-the case will be sent to the jury, and the jury will ap-
portion damages "the best it can.
'149
IV. EFFECT OF MARKET SHARE LIABILITY ON THE LAw OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A POLICY ANALYSIS
Since market share liability applies in a products liability con-
text, the doctrine should be analyzed according to its success in
furthering the three basic goals that underlie modern products lia-
bility law. The first of these goals is risk spreading, which provides
145. See authorities cited note 81 supra.
146. 4 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 18, at 493.
147. Note, supra note 23, at 1010; 94 HAlv. L. REv., supra note 50, at 676; 11 SEToN
HALL L. REv., supra note 79, at 620-21.
148. 11 SETON HALL L. REv., supra note 79, at 621.
149. SindeU v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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compensation to accident victims by shifting losses to product
manufacturers who pass their costs on to the public in the form of
price increases. 150 The second goal is deterrence; it aims to provide
manufacturers with a financial incentive to improve the safety of
their products. This objective can be attained only if the cost of
reducing accidents is less than the cost of paying for the harm that
the product caused.1 51 The Sindell court specifically mentioned
these two ends of products liability law as justifications for the
market share liability theory. 52 The goals favor the plaintiff be-
cause they almost always point toward the imposition of liability;
the plaintiff will be favored even in the absence of adequate proof
of negligence, a defect, or causation in fact.1 53
The last goal of products liability law, which is not discussed
as frequently as the first two, is to protect manufacturers from lia-
bility that is unduly burdensome. 15  Thus, products liability law
contains rules that require proof of a defect and causation to fur-
ther the policy of protecting potential defendants. This goal often
conflicts with the two objectives discussed above because it usually
indicates that liability should not be imposed. The standard of liv-
ing and quality of life in this country has improved significantly
over the past one hundred years, in large part because of the use of
dangerous machinery and drugs. A system that imposes excessive
liability on the manufacturers of these products will inhibit their
production and diminish their availability to an undesirable ex-
tent. For example, to impose liability on all automobile manufac-
turers for all the harm that their automobiles cause-even in the
absence of a defect-would be consistent with the policies of risk
spreading and deterrence. Courts, however, refrain from imposing
such excessive liability because the effect on the industry would be
devastating.
Courts in products liability cases are faced with the problem
of achieving an appropriate balance between the competing goals
of products liability law. On the one hand, the law ought to pro-
150. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52
TEx. L. Rav. 81, 82-84, 87-88 (1973); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect,
5 ST. MARY'S L.J., 30, 34-35 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
151. Holford, supra note 150, at 82-84, 87-88 (1973); Wade, supra note 150, at 826.
152. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
153. See generally notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
154. See W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 22; Henderson, supra note 10, at 691; Note,
supra note 50, at 310-11; 94 H~Av. L. Rav., supra note 50, at 674-75.
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vide manufacturers with a sufficiently strong incentive to produce
safe products. On the other hand, the incentive must not be so
strong that it unduly inhibits the development and marketing of
nondefective products that are useful but dangerous. As stated
above, one of the purposes that the causation in fact requirement
serves is to protect defendants from excessive liability. The market
share liability theory, however, relaxes traditional rules of causa-
tion considerably, which increases the liability exposure of defen-
dants. The question inevitably arises, therefore, whether market
share liability strikes an appropriate balance between the compet-
ing policy considerations underlying products liability law.
One of the first considerations that emerges when considering
this question is the effect that the theory will have on the market-
ing of products other than DES. Over-deterrence is not a problem
with DES because the government has disapproved the use of the
drug for preventing miscarriages.' 55 The market share theory, how-
ever, conceivably could apply to all potentially harmful fungible
products made from an identical formula.156 Therefore, the theory
could encompass the manufacturing and marketing of cigarettes,
157
food additives, 58 generic drugs, 59 asbestos,1 6 0 pesticides, 6' alumi-
num wire, 6 ' industrial waste e16  and products that cause environ-
mental pollution.'" Obviously, the potential liability to the pro-
ducers of these products and other fungible goods is enormous.
Thus, to avoid over-deterrence, the producers must receive from
the courts some guarantee that their liability will be limited even
under the market share theory.
The application of the market share liability theory probably
is limited to fungible goods. At the very least, the language in the
Sindell opinion would seem to indicate that the California court
155. Comment, supra note 2, at 965-66.
156. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Birnbaum, supra note 112, at 27, col. 2;
Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344 (1973).
157. Note, supra note 23, at 1002; Note, supra note 50, at 301 n.81.
158. Note, supra note 23, at 1002; Note, supra note 50, at 301 n.82.
159. Note, supra note 23, at 1002; Note, supra note 50, at 301 n.82.
160. Comment, supra note 2, at 974 n.36; Note, Industry-Wide Liability and Market
Share Allocation of Damages 15 GA. L. REv. 423, 425 n.10 (1981); Note, supra note 50, at
301 n.82; 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 926, 934 n.63 (1980).
161. Comment, supra note 2, at 974-75 n.36; Note, supra note 50, at 301 n.82.
162. 49 U. CIN. L. REv., supra note 160, at 934 n.63.
163. Note, supra note 23, at 1002.
164. Id. at 1002; Note, supra note 160, at 475; Note, supra note 50, at 301 n.82.
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contemplated such a limitation. 165 The theory cannot be applied in
cases in which quality control standards differ within the industry,
since under these circumstances, some manufacturers will produce
safer products than others. 6 The imposition of liability in this sit-
uation actually could reduce a manufacturer's incentive to produce
safer products. If a manufacturer realizes that it will be held liable
for a portion of the harm that preventable manufacturing defects
cause regardless of the amount of care that it takes in the produc-
tion of its products, then the manufacturer will have little financial
incentive to implement effective quality control techniques. Con-
ceivably, if the specter of liability is sufficiently high, the manufac-
turer might decide to cease production altogether. Aside from this
extreme situation, the manufacturer will have an incentive to use
quality control techniques only if its share of the market is so large
that its failure to use them would create liability in excess of the
cost of the quality control measures. Thus, market share liabil-
ity-if it is imposed at all-should be limited to fungible goods.
Market share liability clearly should not apply, however, to
fungible goods cases in which the manufactured product contains a
manufacturing defect rather than a design defect.167 A manufactur-
ing defect occurs when a particular product differs from others in
the line because it contains a unique condition that the manufac-
turer did not intend-for example, when one dose of a vaccine con-
tains an impurity that injures a consumer. A design defect, on the
other hand, occurs when an entire line of products is defective be-
cause the design or composition of the product presents an unac-
ceptable risk. By increasing quality control standards, a manufac-
turer normally can reduce the number of manufacturing defects in
its products. Thus, the application of market share liability to
manufacturing defect cases would be a mistake 68 because it would
reduce substantially the safety incentive rationale underlying prod-
ucts liability law.
Market share liability will provide an incentive to promote
safety" 9 as long as it applies only to fungible products with design
165. Sindel v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d, 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
166. Davis v. Yearwood, 612 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. App. 1980); R. EPSTEIN, supra note 6,
at 158; Symposium on Products Liability, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 675, 686 (1974); 94 HARv. L.
REV., supra note 50, at 677.
167. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 158; Symposium on Products Liability, supra note
166, at 686; 94 HARv. L. REV., supra note 50, at 678.
168. Symposium on Products Liability, supra note 166, at 686.
169. Comment, supra note 2, at 1004-05; 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv., supra note 50, at
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defects. 1 0 Some writers, however, contend that the safety incentive
is too great, and that the market share doctrine will discourage the
development of valuable new products because manufacturers will
fear excessive liability for injuries resulting from products with de-
sign defects.17 1 Two consequences of market share liability create
the possibility that this form of over-deterrence will result from
the application of the doctrine. The first consequence is that the
theory dramatically increases the liability exposure of manufactur-
ers of fungible goods by relaxing the traditional proof requirements
on the issue of causation. Damages in DES cases alone are esti-
mated in the billions of dollars,7 2 and equally large sums could be
at risk in cases concerning other fungible goods such as asbestos,
hazardous wastes, and similar generic drugs to be marketed in the
future. Of course, as between the innocent victim and the manu-
facturer who caused the harm, it is fair to shift the loss to the lat-
ter even if the manufacturer is equally innocent.1 3 While compen-
sation might be desirable in these cases, over-deterrence could
result if the manufacturer perceives this additional cost to be
greater than it feasibly can transfer to the consumers of its prod-
ucts. Under these circumstances, the manufacturer might decide
against marketing the product at all, which-if the product is
worthwhile-will thwart the goal of not discouraging socially desir-
able activity. Moreover, the doctrine could result in the suppres-
sion of useful products that are entirely harmless. Manufacturers
often must base their decisions upon incomplete information. If a
product presents a risk of causing an unknown harm in the distant
future, the market share liability theory may induce the manufac-
turer to withhold the product from the market, notwithstanding
that the product ultimately might prove to be entirely harmless.
The fear of over-deterrence is particularly significant in Cali-
fornia, where a manufacturer's liability exposure was higher than
in most states even before the development of market share liabil-
ity. In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.'74 the California Supreme
Court adopted a very liberal test for what constitutes a defect in
149.
170. See notes 165-68 supra and accompanying text.
171. Note, supra note 160, at 436-38; Note, supra note 50, at 311.
172. See generally text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
173. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 382 So. 2d 184, 189 (La. App.) ("[O]ut
of two innocent parties, the owner or guardian of a thing should pay for any damage caused
by that thing."), cert. denied, 384 So. 2d 447 (La. 1980).
174. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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design defect cases. The court held that a product would be con-
sidered defective in design if it either frustrates consumer expecta-
tions or is unreasonably dangerous in hindsight-applying the
state of the art at the time of trial rather than at the time of man-
ufacture. 17 5 Other courts had used both of these tests for some
time, but Barker increased the defendant's potential liability expo-
sure by applying the tests in the disjunctive. Under the Barker
test, the consumer expectations test presumably could impose lia-
bility in some cases in which the unreasonably dangerous test
would not, and vice versa.
1 8
DES probably is defective under both prongs of the Barker
defect test,1177 regardless of whether the plaintiff is able to establish
negligence. In addition, Barker shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant to establish that the design was not unreasonably dan-
gerous in situations in which the plaintiff has shown that the de-
sign of the product was a proximate cause of his injury.17 8 By shift-
ing the burden of proof, Barker ensures that the plaintiff will be
more likely to prevail in borderline cases. Combining the relaxed
rules of causation under the market share liability theory with the
liberalized defect rules in Barker will increase a defendant's poten-
tial liability in California well beyond that which is possible in
other states.
179
Whether Barker's relaxed standard for proving a defect ap-
plies in market share liability cases, or whether plaintiffs instead
must prove that the defendant manufacturers were negligent, is
unclear. Some of the language in Sindell refers to the negligence of
defendants,1 80 which gives rise to the implication that negligence
may be required in all market share liability cases. If negligence is
required, then the defendants' liability exposure would be re-
stricted substantially. The Sindell court, however, did not discuss
the duty question, 181 even though plaintiff in Sindell alleged that
175. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
176. For an in-depth comparison of these two defect tests, see Fischer, Products Lia-
bility-Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 93, 96-110 (1979).
177. Note, supra note 10, at 681-84.
178. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at
239-40. For a discussion of the burden of proof rule in products liability cases, see Schwartz,
Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALiF. L. RE V. 435, 464-72 (1979).
179. Note, supra note 10, at 681-84; 11 SE'TON HALL L. REv., supra note 79, at 626.
180. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
181. 20 WASHBURN L.J., supra note 79, at 477.
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defendants were negligent.182 Moreover, as discussed previously,
market share liability is derived from alternative liability, and the
version of alternative liability that is embodied in the Restatement
applies the theory to strict liability cases as well as to negligence
cases. s In addition, the law review comment that influenced the
court in Sindell applies its version of the market share theory to
both negligence and strict liability actions.1 84 Nevertheless, to the
extent that negligence is required for the application of the market
share theory, the liability exposure for potential defendants will be
reduced significantly.
Although the court in Sindell did not specify whether the
market share theory would apply only to cases in which a manufac-
turer is negligent, some authority exists for the proposition that
courts in any event will impose a negligence requirement only in
those market share liability cases that deal with drugs.185 Some
court decisions, including several pre-Barker California cases, have
applied a negligence standard rather than a strict liability standard
in determining the reasonableness of design or warning defects to
pharmaceutical products.' Thus, since the Barker decision dealt
with defective machinery, its holding might not apply to drug
cases. Under this reasoning, the Barker defect standard arguably
applies in all market share liability cases except those concerning
drugs. Whether negligence is required in all market share liability
cases, in no market share liability cases, or only in cases that deal
with drugs is unresolved. To the extent that negligence is not re-
quired, however, the result will be a liability exposure that is sub-
stantially higher than normal, which in turn may be a real impedi-
ment to the marketing of new and potentially beneficial products.
The market share liability theory also creates the possibility of
over-deterrence in a more serious way because the theory creates
the very real possibility that a defendant will be held liable for
more harm than it actually caused. The analysis in part III of this
Article examined numerous practical and theoretical difficulties
that make the theory unlikely to be able to apportion damages in
proportion to the amount of harm caused. Indeed, some manufac-
182. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594-95, 607 P.2d 924, 925-26, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 133-34, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
183. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
184. Comment, supra note 2, at 995.
185. See id. at 967 & n.18; Note, supra note 10, at 684-88; 94 HARv. L. REv., supra
note 50, at 669 & n.12.
186. Note, supra note 10, at 685-87.
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turers probably will be held liable for a disproportionate share of
the damages, and among these defendants, damages probably will
not be apportioned accurately according to each one's actual mar-
ket share. Moreover, the prospect of excessive liability can inhibit
cautious manufacturers from entering the marketplace.
A second consequence of the market share liability theory that
could result in over-deterrence is the enormous litigation costs
which are associated with the theory.187 In DES cases, for example,
a plaintiff is free to bring her action against as many as three hun-
dred individual defendants. In addition, because the defendants
have conflicting interests in the question of their relative market
shares, each defendant must retain its own counsel. Discovery will
be enormously time consuming and expensive even if the plaintiff
joins only a few manufacturers as defendants, since large numbers
of manufacturers and distributors of the drug must be involved in
the discovery process to allow for a thorough examination of the
issues of market share and exculpation. Furthermore, if multiple
plaintiffs bring the action, the litigation could be very protracted,
especially if different definitions of the relevant market are used
for different plaintiffs. The legal fees and administrative costs aris-
ing from litigation of this magnitude easily could rival the cost of
the plaintiff's judgment.
In sum, the risk of over-deterrence in market share liability
cases is extremely high. Unfortunately, the theory fails to differen-
tiate between cases in which risk spreading is both feasible and
desirable and cases in which it is not. Rather, the doctrine applies
uniformly without making allowance for policy considerations such
as the seriousness of the harm or the plaintiff's need for compensa-
tion. Manufacturers, therefore, are justified in fearing that their
potential liability costs will be too excessive to risk producing the
product in question. The DES cases provide a ready illustration.
DES allegedly has caused a serious form of cancer in a relatively
small number of cases, and it has caused adenosis in a large num-
ber of cases.188 Risk spreading may be very desirable in the cancer
cases, since they are relatively few in number and can result in
substantial pecuniary damage in the form of lost wages and medi-
cal expenses that the victim may not be able to afford. Risk
spreading in the adenosis cases, however, may not be either as fea-
sible or as necessary as in the cancer cases. Some recent medical
187. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 157, 160.
188. See notes 2-16 supra and accompanying text.
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evidence indicates that adenosis is not a precancerous condition
but a harmless illness that often disappears spontaneously.
8 9 If
adenosis is not precancerous, a large portion of the damages al-
leged in these cases may be for psychological harm. Mental suffer-
ing of this nature, however, cannot be measured accurately in mon-
etary terms because no marketplace exists for this suffering that
can serve as a guideline for courts to follow. 190 Damages for mental
suffering, when awarded by a sympathetic jury, may be too large to
justify spreading them among the manufacturers. Moreover, the
large number of adenosis cases also may make the spreading of
these damages infeasible. In addition, loss spreading may not be as
useful in adenosis cases as it is in cancer cases because money
damages may not be as adequate a remedy for mental suffering as
it is for other types of harm.19' The failure of the market share
liability theory to make the distinction between those cases in
which risk spreading is appropriate and those in which it is not
greatly enhances the potential for excessive liability.
V. CONCLUSION
The market share liability theory has substantial superficial
appeal as an equitable solution to dilemmas like the ones posed in
the DES cases. Theoretically, injured plaintiffs are allowed to re-
cover their damages, and, because damages are apportioned ac-
cording to each defendant's market share, defendants are not sub-
jected to excessive liability. Unfortunately, as this Article has
illustrated, the doctrine cannot withstand close analysis.
Sindell adapted the alternative liability doctrine to fit the
DES cases in part because it wanted to further the risk spreading
and deterrence goals of modern products liability law. 9' In Sindell
the court specifically cited these two objectives as a basis for its
decision.193 One of the primary problems of the market share the-
ory is that the various requirements of the doctrine significantly
impair its ability to encourage risk distribution without creating
over-deterrence. For example, the market share theory requires
189. See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text. The evidence concerning adenosis is
incomplete. Future research may show that adenosis is indeed quite harmful.
190. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996
(1958).
191. Id.
192. Comment, supra note 2, at 1005-06; Note, supra note 6, at 704-06.
193. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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that enough defendants be joined to represent a "substantial
share" of the market.1 9 4 The doctrine also allows any defendant to
escape liability completely upon a showing that it could not have
caused the injury to the plaintiff'9 5 and holds the remaining defen-
dants liable for the entire amount of the judgment even though the
market may not be represented fully in the lawsuit.196 Although
these requirements were designed to legitimate market share liabil-
ity as a derivative of alternative liability, they are not consistent
with conventional risk distribution principles because they inevita-
bly will prevent damages from being apportioned according to each
defendant's market share.197 Under these circumstances, the courts
will be able to achieve their risk distribution goals only by impos-
ing on the industry a much greater hardship than is actually
necessary.
Furthermore, the market share liability theory fails to achieve
the goals of its progenitor-alternative liability. Alternative liabil-
ity is a fault-based doctrine that is designed to impose liability in
cases in which the application of traditional rules of causation
would result in a finding for the defendants even though moral
blame is high. 9 8 Market share liability, however, can dilute blame
to the point of insignificance because of the large number of poten-
tial defendants and the lack of assurance that the actual culprit is
before the court.199 Thus, the justifications that typically are given
for the alternative liability theory do not provide support for the
market share liability theory.
Whether the plaintiff's losses ought to be shifted is a policy
question that the individual court must decide for itself. If a court
does choose to transfer losses from the innocent plaintiff to the
defendants, some mechanism other than market share liability
ought to be used to effectuate the shift. Although there is some
order in the manner in which the doctrine imposes liability, the
doctrine appears capable of allocating losses among defendants on
a speculative basis. A potential defendant's belief that liability
under the theory is imposed haphazardly may cause that defen-
dant to withdraw the item entirely from the market. If a sufficient
number of potential defendants react in this manner, then the en-
194. 20 WASHBURN L.J., supra note 79, at 476 n.60.
195. Note, supra note 160, at 448; see text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
196. See notes 116-30 supra and accompanying text.
197. See generally part HI supra.
198. See notes 44-71 supra and accompanying text.
199. See notes 93-109 supra and accompanying text.
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tire industry could be disrupted.
Sindell is part of a trend among jurisdictions to relax estab-
lished principles of tort law when necessary to permit recovery. 00
The rules that result from this relaxation frequently do not pro-
vide juries with sufficient guidance to make their determinations.
The current bent toward applying comparative negligence in strict
liability cases is illustrative of this point.20 1 Although it is logically
impossible to compare the plaintiff's negligence with the defen-
dant's strict liability, many courts nevertheless have required ju-
ries to make such a comparison. The courts' failure to provide ade-
quate guidance invites juries to decide cases based either on
speculation or on considerations that are irrelevant to the case.
If the market share liability theory is extended to its logical
conclusion, its principles theoretically could apply to all cases in
which causation is questionable.20 2 Under the market share theory,
the defendant's liability is discounted by the probability that it did
not cause the plaintiff's harm. One commentator has suggested
that this approach should be applied in comparative negligence
cases in which causation is uncertain.20 Another writer has urged
that the theory should be adopted in cases in which buried chemi-
cal waste has caused harm to the plaintiff. 204 Conceivably, courts
eventually could impose liability solely in proportion to the mere
probability that the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff's
injury.
The DES cases provide an excellent illustration of the interac-
tion between probabilities and the market share liability theory.
Two separate questions of causation are present in these cases.20
First, the plaintiff must prove that her mother's use of DES caused
the injury-either adenosis or adenocarcinoma-that she sus-
tained. Second, the plaintiff must prove that a specific defendant
supplied the DES that her mother consumed. The Sindell court
200. Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 996. See generally Epstein, supra note 35. Although market share
liability does not impose absolute liability on defendants, it does relax the already liberal
rules of products liability law. In this sense, market share liability is at least a step in the
direction of absolute liability.
201. For a discussion of this trend, see Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of
Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. Rsv. 431 (1978).
202. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 61, at 128-30; Malone, supra note 40, at 80-81.
203. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of
Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 413-14 (1978).
204. 14 U. MICH. J. OF L. REF. 53 (1980).
205. Note, supra note 6, at 714.
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modified the latter aspect of causation and basically held the de-
fendants liable according to the probability that their product
caused the harm. The initial causation question, however, could
also be decided on a probability theory. For example, twenty-nine
percent of the reported adenocarcinoma cases apparently occured
even though the patient's mother had no exposure to DES.
2 0 6
Therefore, it is not clear that all cases of adenocarcinoma associ-
ated with the use of DES actually were caused by DES. The diag-
nosis that the DES caused the plaintiff's harm can only be made
by examining family history and other important information, and
even then doctors cannot be certain that the drug caused the pa-
tient to develop adenocarcinoma.0 7 If the only available evidence
showed a forty percent chance that DES caused the plaintiff's ill-
ness, then, under the traditional "more likely than not" rule of
causation, the plaintiff would not be able to recover. If a
probability theory were applied, however, the plaintiff would be
able to recover forty percent of her damages from the supplier of
the drug.
Using probability to discount the plaintiff's recovery in all
cases of questionable causation could result in over-deterrence for
many of the same reasons that market share liability in its present
form may have this effect. First, it would greatly increase the po-
tential liability of defendants. Courts would allow substantial re-
coveries in many cases in which plaintiffs could not present an ac-
ceptable case under the traditional approach. Clearly, this
increased liability exposure would inhibit the marketing of useful
products if potential defendants fear that their losses will be too
prohibitive for them to pass on to the public.20 8
The second major drawback to a logical extension of the mar-
ket share theory is that problems of proof may arise, which in turn
creates the possibility of irrational verdicts. The theory by defini-
tion permits recovery in cases in which the evidence is inadequate
to place responsibility upon any particular defendant. Theoreti-
cally, courts could require a finding of the probability of causation
by the traditional "more likely than not" standard. Even if courts
were to do this, however, application of the standard probably
would not be workable in practice. Although a court is justified in
instructing the jury to find causation on a "more likely than not"
206. See notes 11-16 supra and accompanying text.
207. Note, supra note 6, at 696, 713-14.
208. See notes 172-86 supra and accompanying text.
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basis, the court will be inviting jury confusion if it instructs the
jury to find the defendant liable only if it finds that the
probability of causation is more likely than not. In other words,
using the DES hypothetical posed above, to hold the defendant
liable the jury must find that a fifty-one percent probability exists
that the defendant created a forty percent risk of causing the
harm. A jury that fails to comprehend such an instruction might
decide the issue on sheer speculation. If the jury does make a spec-
ulative determination, the defendants could be held liable for more
harm than they possibly could have caused.
A third factor militating against using probability to discount
the plaintiff's recovery in all cases of questionable causation is the
litigation costs that would be associated with such a theory. If, for
example, three cases arise in which a one-third probability exists
that defendant X caused the alleged harm, then in theory X
should be liable for one-third of the damages in each case because
he is statistically likely to have caused one hundred percent of the
damages in one of the cases-if the damages in all three cases are
the same. Defendant X's litigation costs, however, would be three
times higher than normal because X was forced to participate in
three cases rather than one.
A major problem in the law of products liability is the failure
of courts to account for the effect of excessive liability on potential
defendants. While the goal of compensating injured accident vic-
tims is worthwhile, it cannot be regarded as the sole objective of
tort law.20 9 The adversary system was designed to resolve disputes
among individuals in an impartial manner, and any attempt to
convert it into a compensation system will fail because of the enor-
mous cost to society.21 0 The market share liability theory is a dan-
gerous step towards just such a conversion, and courts in the fu-
ture should reject it as a method for imposing liability in civil
cases.
209. Epstein, supra note 35, at 644-45, 659.
210. Id. at 660-61.
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